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Zusammenfassung
Dialog als kollaboratives Handeln
Theorien sozialer Prozesse haben sich traditionell auf individualisierte Un-
tersuchungseinheiten konzentriert, etwa auf die Person, die Gemeinschaft, die
Organisation. Die Beziehungen zwischen den Einheiten werden dadurch margi-
nalisiert und oft auf kausale Relationen reduziert. Nicht zuletzt aus diesem Grund
erscheinen dialogische Prozesse bis heute nicht ausreichend theoretisch beleuchtet.
Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert zunächst einige vorliegende Theorien des
Dialogs, um dann für die Konzeptualisierung des Dialogs als kollaborativem
Handeln zu plädieren. Die Konstitution von Bedeutung wird dabei nicht dem
Individuum und seinen Fähigkeiten, sondern dem kollaborativen Prozess selbst
zugeschrieben. Die bedeutungsvollen (Sprech-)Handlungen der Dialogteilneh-
menden sind mithin ko-konstitutiv und die Unterscheidung von Ursache und
Wirkung wird obsolet. Der Beitrag diskutiert die Implikationen dieser Sichtweise
unter Berücksichtigung kultureller und historischer Kontexte dialogischen Han-
delns.
Schüsselwörter: Dialog, kollaboratives Handeln, Diskurs, Bedeutung
Summary
Social theory has traditionally centered on individuated units, the person, the
community, the organization, and so on. Relations among units are thus margi-
nalized, and when theorized, typically presume causal relations between the units.
Partly for these reasons, dialogue remains under-theorized. The present attempt
begins by considering the ideological saturation of many existing conceptualiza-
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tions of dialogue. Moving beyond these, a case is made for dialogue as collabora-
tive action. On this account, meaning is not a possession of the individual, but
of a collaborative process. An individual’s meaning comes into being through the
other, and vice versa. Thus, linguistic acts of the participants are co-constituting.
Cause and effect become irrelevant. Implications of this view are discussed, inclu-
ding the culturally and historical context of dialogic efficacy.
Keywords: dialogue, collaborative action, discourse, meaning
Zusammenfassung
Dialog als kollaboratives Handeln Theorien sozialer Prozesse haben sich tra-
ditionell auf individualisierte Untersuchungseinheiten konzentriert, etwa auf die
Person, die Gemeinschaft, die Organisation. Die Beziehungen zwischen den
Einheiten werden dadurch marginalisiert und oft auf kausale Relationen reduziert.
Nicht zuletzt aus diesem Grund erscheinen dialogische Prozesse bis heute nicht
ausreichend theoretisch beleuchtet. Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert zunächst
einige vorliegende Theorien des Dialogs, um dann für die Konzeptualisierung
des Dialogs als kollaborativem Handeln zu plädieren. Die Konstitution von Be-
deutung wird dabei nicht dem Individuum und seinen Fähigkeiten, sondern dem
kollaborativen Prozess selbst zugeschrieben. Die bedeutungsvollen (Sprech-
)Handlungen der Dialogteilnehmenden sind mithin ko-konstitutiv und die Un-
terscheidung von Ursache und Wirkung wird obsolet. Der Beitrag diskutiert die
Implikationen dieser Sichtweise unter Berücksichtigung kultureller und histori-
scher Kontexte dialogischen Handelns.
Schlagwörter: Dialog, kollaboratives Handeln, Diskurs, Bedeutung
The need for illuminating theory of dialogue has never been greater, while
simultaneously, the available resources few. There are good reasons for this con-
dition. Regarding the need, the world condition is one in which there are unpar-
alleled possibilities for human interchange. The internet, cell-phone, jet transpor-
tation, and the like, virtually eliminate the barriers of space and time separating
one person from another. As a result, virtually any group of people – small or
large – can locate like-minded associates from around the world. Together they
may generate, sustain, defend, and expand a body of ideas, associated values, and
ways of life. Each group forms a potential island of meaning and direction poten-
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tially cut away from other groups. Thus, whether political, religious, ethnic,
ideological, communal, or national, there is an exponential increase in the poten-
tial for conflict with other groups, and the conditions of conflict expand exponen-
tially. In a world where all individuals now possess destructive potential, we face
a Hobbesian dystopia of all groups against all. Dialogue is one of the few means
available for transcending boundaries of difference.
With respect to the lack of resources, social theory in Western culture has
largely been restricted to one of two domains: the individual person or the social
group. In both cases there is a strong penchant for entification, that is, for viewing
the world as made of up of fundamentally independent entities. Scholarship va-
riously focuses, then, on the psychological makeup of the individual, group
functioning, organizations, and cultures. In the case of dialogue, the minimal
unit of concern is the interaction between two or more persons. However, because
of the traditional focus on the psychological basis of individual functioning, the
process of interchange has been a poor stepchild. If individual persons constitute
the atoms of understanding, then relationships are secondary and artificial. It
should be no surprise that the fields of social linguistics and communication
were late-comers to the divisions of knowledge.
It is against this backdrop that I wish to lay the groundwork for a theory of
dialogue that does not begin with the assumption of independent entities, and
specifically, with a view of isolated minds seeking to communicate.1 This account
will be composed of three parts. As a précis, I will first propose to move beyond
prescriptively based conceptions of dialogue. I will then outline the rudiments
of a theory of dialogue in which collaborative action takes center stage. Finally,
I will treat several broad implications of this perspective.
Beyond Prescriptive Definitions of Dialogue
There are scholars and practitioners who have been drawn to the potentials for
dialogue to transform social worlds. However, their investments are not accom-
panied by agreement in how dialogue is to be conceptualized. Hosannas to dia-
logue are loudly sung, but with little realization that such praise may be directed
toward entirely different practices. On a simple level, The American Heritage
Dictionary offers the common definition of dialogue as »conversation between
two or more people«. However, virtually no scholarly work on dialogue shares
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this definition; scholars of dialogue are seldom interested in mere conversation.
Nor do such scholars typically share definitions with each other. In my view, the
primary definitional criterion of most contemporary analyses of dialogue is derived
from a vision of an ideal form of relationship; dialogue is defined in terms of the
favored ideal. For most contemporary analysts, merely having a conversation does
not constitute authentic dialogue.
It is primarily the particular vision of the ideal that sets various dialogic
scholars apart. David Bohm’s (1996) popular work, On Dialogue, defines dialogue
as a form of communication from which something new emerges; participants
must evidence a »relaxed, non-judgmental curiosity, with the aim of seeing things
as freshly and clearly as possible« (p. ix). Yet, Robert Grudin’s On Dialogue is not
so much interested in relationships that create novelty as he is in a »reciprocal
exchange of meaning…across a physical or mental space« (p. 11). In contrast,
Putnam and Fairhurst (2001) are not centrally concerned with either generating
novelty or exchanging meaning, but rather with the creation of convergence in
views; they define dialogue as »a mode of communication that builds mutuality
through the awareness of others« (p. 116), and it does so through the »use of ge-
nuine or authentic discourse, and reliance on the unfolding interaction« (p. 116).
At the same time, for L. C. Hawes (1999), the central ingredient of dialogue is
conflict reduction; for him dialogue is a »praxis for mediating competing and
contradictory discourses« (p. 229). In further contrast, while many of the above
scholars assume that dialogue is among equals, Eisenberg and Goodall (1993)
are chiefly concerned with enhancing the voices of minorities. They see dialogue
as providing parties with a chance to speak and be heard and to challenge the
traditional positioning of authority. Quite distinct from all these orientations,
Isaacs (1993) defines dialogue as »a sustained collective inquiry into the processes,
assumptions, and certainties that compose everyday experience« (p. 25). Finally,
for Tullio Maranhao (1990), it is not everyday life that dialogue should throw
into question but all certainty of knowledge. For him dialogue is a logic of stating
and questioning, with the aim of generating the kind of skepticism that invites
continuous inquiry. For Maranhao, dialogue is a form of »anti-epistemology«.
With such differing views of dialogue, each saturated as it is with values and
visions, any general characterization of dialogue becomes perilous. In order to
establish a more comprehensive analytic frame, while not sacrificing valuable
4 Kenneth J. Gergen
distinctions embedded in these various accounts, it is useful to separate the nor-
mative from the descriptive. Rather than equating the term »dialogue« with any
particular vision of ideal interchange, a non-partisan definition might be useful.
Variations in the specific patterning of interchange may thus reflect the various
ideal forms sought by differing scholars. In this way we might return to an ele-
mental formulation, but nevertheless open a space for considering variations in
specific forms and functions. I do not propose a return to the view of »dialogue
as conversation,« as such return does not serve our analytic ends here. The term
»conversation« is both ambiguous and conceptually thin. Nor, as indicated earlier,
do I wish to return to the assumption of dialogue as a form of inter-subjective
interchange. I turn, then, to the potential of viewing dialogue as collaborative
action.
The Co-Active Origins of Meaning
In foregrounding the concept of collaboration we mean to call attention to the
relational foundation of dialogue. That is, meaning within dialogue is an outcome
not of individual action and reaction, but of what Shotter (1984) calls joint-action,
or the coordinated actions of the participants. In this sense, the meaning of an
individual’s expression within a dialogue depends importantly on the response
of his or her interlocutor – what has elsewhere been called »a supplement« (Ger-
gen, 1994). No individual expression harbors meaning in itself. For example,
what we might conventionally index as a »hostile remark« can be turned into »a
joke« through a response of laughter; the »vision statement« of a superior can be
refigured as »mere window dressing« through the shared smirk of the employees.
It is useful to begin by considering Wittgenstein’s (1963) metaphor of the
language game as the origin of word meaning. The metaphor calls attention
specifically to the coordinated or rule-governed activities of the participants in
generating meaning. The words »half-volley« and »overhead smash« acquire their
meaning by virtue of the participation of the interlocutors in the rule constrained
talk of tennis. Words invented by a single individual (a »private language« in
Wittgenstein’s terms) would not in themselves constitute meaningful entries into
meaning.2 Or, as we might say, the meaning of any utterance depends on its
functioning within a relational matrix. It follows that we cannot comprehend
dialogue as the exchange of independent utterances by two or more interlocutors.
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Rather, the utterances gain their particular meaning from within the »game«
played by the interlocutors.
This view of dialogue as a collective achievement emerges from a broad array
of scholarship, including developments in ethnomethodology, the history of
science, the sociology of knowledge, discursive psychology, literary theory and
communication theory.3 In each of these cases there is a strong tendency to place
the locus of meaning within the process of interaction itself. That is, the indivi-
dual agent is de-emphasized as the source of meaning; attention moves from the
within to the between. Yet, while recognition of the jointly constructed character
of meaning has become increasingly widespread, there is as yet no comprehensive
account of how such a process occurs. If we accept such an orientation, what are
the action implications; what new conceptual resources can be mobilized, what
new questions are raised? For purposes of furthering such inquiry, I offer several
rudiments of a collaborative account of the achievement of meaning in dialogue:
An individual’s utterances in themselves possess no meaning.
We pass each other on the street. I smile and say, »Hello Anna«. You walk
past without hearing. Under such conditions, what have I said? To be sure, I
have uttered two words. However for all the difference it makes I might have
chosen two nonsense syllables. You pass and I say »Umlot nigen«. You hear
nothing. When you fail to acknowledge me in any way, all words become equi-
valent. In an important sense, nothing has been said at all. I cannot possess
meaning alone.4 The potential for meaning is realized through supplementary
action.
Lone utterances begin to acquire meaning when another (or others) coordi-
nate themselves to the utterance, that is, when they add some form of supplemen-
tary action (whether linguistic or otherwise). Effectively, I have greeted Anna
only by virtue of her response. »Oh, hi, good morning…« brings me to life as
one who has greeted. Supplements may be very simple, as simple as a nod of af-
firmation that indeed you have said something meaningful. It may take the form
of an action, e.g. shifting the line of gaze upon hearing the word, »look!«. Or it
may extend the utterance in some way, as in »Yes, but I also think that…«. We
thus find that to communicate at all is to be granted by others a privilege of
meaning. If others do not treat one’s utterances as communication, if they fail
to coordinate themselves around the offering, one is reduced to nonsense.
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To combine these first two proposals, we see that meaning resides within
neither individual, but only in relationship. Both act and supplement must be
coordinated in order for meaning to occur. Like a handshake, a kiss, or a tango,
the individual’s actions alone are empty. Communication is inherently collabora-
tive. In this way we see that none of the words that comprise our vocabulary have
meaning in themselves. They are granted the capacity to mean by virtue of the
way they are coordinated with other words and actions. Indeed, our entire voca-
bulary of the individual – who thinks, feels, wants, hopes, and so on – is granted
meaning only by virtue of coordinated activities among people. The birth of
»myself« lies within relationship. Supplementary action is itself a candidate for
meaning.
Any supplement functions twice, first in granting significance to what has
preceded, and second as an action that also requires supplementation. In effect,
the meaning it grants remains suspended until it too is supplemented. Consider
a client who speaks of her deep depression; she finds herself unable to cope with
an aggressive husband and an intolerable job situation. The therapist can grant
this report meaning as an expression of depression, by responding, »Yes, I can
see why you might feel this way; tell me a little more about your relationship
with your husband«. However, this supplement too stands idle of meaning until
the client provides the supplement. If the client ignored the statement, for example
going on to talk about her success as a mother, the therapist’s words would be
denied significance. More broadly, we may say that in daily life there are no acts
in themselves, that is, actions that are not simultaneously supplements to what
has preceded. Whatever we do or say takes place within a temporal context that
gives meaning to what has preceded, while simultaneously forming an invitation
to further supplementation. Acts create the possibility for meaning but simulta-
neously constrain its potential.
If I give a lecture on psychoanalytic theory, this lecture is meaningless wi-
thout an audience that listens, deliberates, affirms, or questions what I have said.
In this sense, every speaker owes to his or her audience a debt of gratitude; without
their engagement the speaker ceases to exist. At the same time, my lecture creates
the very possibility for the audience to grant meaning. While the audience creates
me as a meaningful agent, I simultaneously grant to them the capacity to create.
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Yet, it is also important to realize that in practice, actions also set constraints
upon supplementation. If I speak on Freud, as an audience member you are not
able to supplement in any way you wish. You may ask me a question about object
relations theory, but not astrophysics; comment on the concept of repression,
but not on taste of radishes. Such constraints exist because my lecture is already
embedded within a tradition of act and supplement. It has been granted meaning
as a »lecture on Freud,« by virtue of previous generations of meaning givers. In
this sense, actions embedded within relationships have prefigurative potential.
The history of usage enables them to invite or suggest certain supplements as
opposed to others – because only these supplements are considered sensible or
meaningful within a tradition. Thus, as we speak with each other, we also begin
to set limits on each other’s being; to remain in the conversation is not only to
respect a tradition, but to accede to being one kind of person as opposed to
another. If you tell me that I have not been a good friend, I will scarcely be reco-
gnizable unless I ask you to tell me why you feel this way, and what have I done.
Your very comment constrains my potentials. Supplements function both to
create and constrain meaning.
As we have seen, supplements »act backward« in a way that creates the
meaning of what has preceded. In this sense, the speaker’s meaning – his or her
identity, character, intention, and the like – are not free to »be what they are,«
but constrained by the act of supplementation. Supplementation thus operates
postfiguratively, to create the speaker as meaning this as opposed to that. From
the enormous array of possibilities, the supplement gives direction and tempora-
rily narrows the possibilities of being. Thus, for example, for a therapist, to inquire
into a client’s depression is to establish a form of constraint. If the client is to
remain sensible, he or she may readily accede to being depressed. Therapeutic
questions are never innocent. While act/supplements are constraining, they do
not determine.
As proposed, our words and actions function so as to constrain the words
and actions of others, and vice versa. If we are to remain intelligible within our
culture, we must necessarily act within these constraints. Such constraints have
their origins in a history of preceding coordinations. As people coordinate actions
and supplements, and come to rely on them in everyday life, they are essentially
generating a tradition. If enough people join in these coordinated activities over
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a long period, we may speak of a cultural tradition. Yet, it is important to unders-
core that our words and actions function only as constraints, and not as determi-
nants. This is so for two important reasons: First, the conditions under which we
attempt to coordinate our actions are seldom constant. We are continuously faced
with the challenge of importing old words and actions into new situations. As
we do so, such words and actions acquire new possibilities for meaning. For ex-
ample, you are visiting a farm and you point out to your child, »look…that is a
chicken«. The word »chicken« thus gains its meaning from the way it is embedded
in this configuration of events. Later that day, the farmer’s wife comes to the
dinner table bearing a large platter, and announces, »We are having chicken for
dinner tonight«. Now the word used in referring to the live and clucking animal
refers to the individual pieces of cooked meat. As new situations develop, so will
the same word acquire other potentials for meaning. More formally, all words
are polysemic; they may be used in many different ways.
A second important reason for our relative freedom of action lies in the fact
that meaning making is always local. That is, coordination is always located in
the here and now, in momentary and fleeting conditions – in the kitchen, the
boardroom, the mine, the prison, and so on. These local efforts to coordinate
give rise to local patterns of speaking and action – street slang, academic jargon,
baby talk, jive talk, signing, and so on. And, because those who enter into such
coordinations may issue from different cultural traditions – new combinations
are always under production. In effect, we inherit an enormous potpourri of po-
tentially intelligible actions – each arising from a different form of life – and the
repository is under continuous motion. Our actions may be invited by history,
but they are not required. In this sense, we can indeed »step over our shadows«.
In order to function adequately in continuously changing circumstances, creative
combinations will always be necessary. As we speak together now we have the
capacity to create new futures. Traditions of coordination furnish the major po-
tentials for meaning, but do not circumscribe.
To amplify a preceding line of reasoning, it is important to recognize that
the words and actions upon which we rely to generate meaning together are lar-
gely byproducts of the past. If I approached you and began to utter a string of
vowels, »ahhh, ehhhh, ooooo, uuuu…,« you would surely be puzzled; perhaps
you would make for an exit, as I might well be dangerous. This is so because such
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utterances are nonsense, or to put it another way, not recognizable as a candidate
for meaning within Western traditions of coordination. Similarly, if we began
to dance and you suddenly crouched and gazed at the floor, I would scarcely
continue dancing. Your actions are not part of any coordinated sequences with
which I am familiar. Our capacity to make meaning together today thus relies
on a history, often a history of centuries’ duration. We owe to traditions of
coordination our capacities for being in love, demonstrating for a just cause, or
taking pleasure in our children’s development.
This is not to say, however, that there is no room for novel words and acti-
ons. Indeed, in the past century we have witnessed an explosion in new vocabu-
lary terms, sporting activities, dance steps, and so on. Because we are not deter-
mined by the past, we are free to play, to violate expectations, to explore the ou-
trageous. And, when we confront the novel word or act, we can with effort bring
it into meaning. To return to our dance, I might well stop dancing when you
crouched on the floor. However, if I understood you to be playing, inviting,
challenging, I would do my best to find a means of coordinating with you. Perhaps
I would also crouch, and begin to sway forward in your direction. Thus, an
adolescent who wears something »weird« to school may give rise to a fad. And
therapists who believe the schizophrenic’s »word salad’ is meaningful will find
ways to render such utterances meaningful. Meanings are subject to continuous
reconstitution via the expanding sea of supplementation.
In light of the above, we find that what an utterance means is inherently
undecidable. No amount of discussion, discourse analysis, conversation analysis,
or other attempt to determine what has been said, can be determinative. The
meaning of any utterance is a temporary achievement, born of the collaborative
moment. Further, as relations continue over time, what is meant stands subject
to continuous alteration through an expanding arena of action/supplements.
Sarah and Robert may find themselves frequently laughing together – affir-
ming each other as humorous persons – until Robert announces that Sarah’s
laughter is »her forced attempt to present herself as an easy going person« (in
which case the definition of the previous actions would be altered). Or Sarah
could announce, »this is all very pleasant, Robert, but really you superficial guy;
we really don’t communicate at all« (thus reducing Robert’s humor to banality).
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At the same time, these latter moves within the ongoing sequence are subject
to further reconstitution. In reply to Robert’s accusation of playing the role of
being casual, Sarah could reply, »Robert, are you worried about your job again?
What’s bothering you?« Or, Robert replies to Sarah’s ascription superficiality
with, »Now I see…You are only saying that, Sarah, because you find Bill so at-
tractive«. Such transformations in meaning may also be far removed from the
interchange itself (e.g. consider a divorcing pair who retrospectively redefine their
entire marital trajectory), and are subject to continuous change through interac-
tion with and among others (e.g. friends, relatives, therapists, the media etc.).
In conclusion, we find the exclusive focus on the face-to-face relationship
is far too narrow. For whether »I make sense« is not under my control; nor is it
determined by you, or the dyadic process in which meaning struggles toward
realization. At the outset, we largely derive our potential for coordination from
our previous immersion in a range of other relationships. We arrive in the relati-
onship as extensions of the past. And, as the current relationship unfolds, it serves
to reform the meaning of the past. These interchanges may be supplemented and
transformed by still others in the future. In effect, meaningful dialogue ultimately
depends on an extended array of relationships, not only »right here, right now,«
but how it is that you and I are related to a variety of other persons, and they to
still others – and ultimately, one may say, to the relational conditions of society
as a whole. We are all in this way interdependently interlinked – without the
capacity to mean anything, to possess an »I« – except for the existence of an ex-
tended world of relationship.
Expanding Potentials
Thus far I have outlined a way of understanding dialogue as a relational achieve-
ment. It remains now to explore a number of significant implications of this view.
At the same time, this exploration should serve to flesh out the theory in way
that it can ultimately speak to issues in practice. Mind as Relational Performance
In their accounts of dialogue most theorists draw from the individualist
tradition in which language is a reflection or expression of the individual mind.
On this account, dialogue is a form of inter-subjective connection or synchrony.
The public actions are derivative of private meanings. In the present account I
have bracketed the realm of subjectivity, and focused on the public coordination
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of discourse. This enables us to avoid a number of intractable philosophical pro-
blems (e.g. the relation of mind to body, the problem of »other minds,« and the
hermeneutic problem of accurate interpretation), and to focus on the relational
function of various utterances within ongoing conversation.5 Utterances are es-
sentially actions performed with social consequences. This is to say that significant
analyses of dialogue can ensue without recourse to psychological explanation.
However, the critic may properly ask at this point, if it is wise to disregard the
contribution of private thought and feeling to the process of dialogue, is it not
short-sighted to abandon concern with processes taking place within the indivi-
dual while dialogue proceeds?
In reply, the effective analysis of dialogue need not refer to states of indivi-
dual understanding, thought, subjective biases, inattention, personality traits,
and so on. This possibility was initially demonstrated in Garfinkel’s (1963)
groundbreaking work on ethnomethodology, and now more copiously in various
forms of discourse and conversation analysis (Wetherell, Taylor & Yates, 2001a,
2001b). At the same time, this is not to exclude concern with what theorists have
traditionally viewed as psychological process. If an intimate friend expresses anger
toward us, we may lapse into silence, unable to respond. However, this does not
mean that we are comatose. A dozen replies may »buzz through our head;« we
ride an emotional roller-coaster. Let us not deny the significance of such events.
However, the existence of unspoken replies does not simultaneously mean a
reinstatement of the subjectivity assumption, the view that meaning originates
in private minds and is expressed outwardly in words. Let us rather reconstruct
the meaning of subjectivity – the »inner world«. How is this so?
Consider: you have agreed to take part in a play, and you must master your
lines before tonight’s rehearsal. With the script before you, you speak the lines;
when they are familiar, you put the book down and perform them more fully –
perhaps with a laugh or a shout. You decide to take a shower, and while you are
showering you try to recall the lines silently. During the silent rehearsal you
move through a clever line and a smile crosses your face. You »feel« the mirth.
Here we see that the distinction between the internal and external world breaks
down. What takes place internally is essentially an action in the external world,
only conducted without full expression. The internal activity is effectively a redu-
ced form of making sense in our common relationships. Thinking, on this ac-
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count, is a form of privately enacted speech – a public act simply carried out in
private.
In much the same way, we may usefully reconfigure the concept of intention.
We commonly speak about our intentions as causing our actions. For example,
we might say to ourselves, »I must apologize«, and then we proceed to do so. To
be sure, the apology may not be defined that way by others; in this sense I need
them to ratify that it is an apology. However, I did know what I was doing at
the time, from my perspective, and this knowing preceded the supplementation.
Such common events are often used to support the assumption of conscious
agency: I chose my actions, I intend certain meanings and not others. This concept
of a free, internal agent that directs the traffic of one’s words and deeds has a long
tradition, and much contemporary support from humanistic scholars. Yet, in
spite of its attraction (»I am the god of my action…«), the concept has faired
poorly both philosophically and ideologically. The notorious problem of free will
on the one hand, and the politics of narcissism on the other, are only two of the
knotty issues. How can we sustain the conception of conscious intention without
falling into these traditional traps?
We find a promising answer by extending the view of thought and feeling
as the private re-enactment of public life. If I am an actor who does what we call,
»playing the part of Hamlet«, I can readily tell someone that, »I am playing
Hamlet tonight«. Public life provides me, then, with a pattern of action and an
acceptable construction of that action. It allows me to tell others that I intend to
play the role of Hamlet tonight. The word »intention« does not direct the action
so much as comment upon its occurrence. In this way I can also say, »I intended
that remark as an apology…« with full assurance, because my immersion in public
life gives me grounds for knowing that the words I have uttered can commonly
be defined as an apology. By the same token, we can say, »he intended to commit
the murder«, not because we have insight into his conscious state, but because
his experience in cultural life furnished him with just this construction of the act
in question. Dialogue as Bodily Enactment in Context
While the present orientation to dialogue emphasizes discourse, this is not
to embrace linguistic reductionism. Spoken (or written) language may be focal
in the present analyses, but other than for analytic purposes I do not wish to se-
parate out spoken or written language from the full panoply of actions that con-
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tribute to the production of meaning. Clearly the action implications of spoken
words within dialogue are fastened to the simultaneous movements of the speakers’
bodies, tone of voice, and physical proximity. The way in which an utterance
such as »I disagree« is supplemented, may depend importantly on the accompa-
nying posture, gestures, and volume of the voice.
At the same time, dialogic efficacy cannot ultimately be separated from the
world of objects and spaces – the material context. The efficacy of one’s words
may importantly depend, for example, on whether one is clutching a gavel, a
dagger, or a bouquet of flowers. In the same way, the meaning of words within
the dialogue may depend on whether they are expressed in an executive suite, in
a bar room, or over the internet. Again to draw from Wittgenstein (1963), the
language games in which we engage are embedded within broader forms of life.
Thus, the meaning of »half-volley« and »overhead smash« not only depend on
the rules of tennis talk, but on their function within a form of life that includes
balls, racquets, nets, lines, players, strawberries and so on. Dialogic Efficacy as
Historically and Culturally Situated.
The contribution of any particular act of speech to dialogic coordination is
contingent on its placement within a cultural context. In part this emphasis
acknowledges Saussure’s (1974) distinction between the synchronic and diachronic
study of language. While we may effectively focus on contemporary forms of
dialogue and their accomplishments (synchronic study), we must also be prepared
for temporal transformations in what and how various ends are accomplished.
For example, for the past several decades, practitioners in the area of conflict re-
duction have made concerted attempts to generate new and more effective forms
of dialogue. Argumentation initially gave way to practices of bargaining, and in
many areas bargaining practices have been replaced by mediation. At the same
time, new forms of mediation are continuously emerging (for a more detailed
account, see Gergen, 2009).
Bakhtin (1981) also draws our attention to the heterogeneous cultural tra-
ditions that typically contribute to the shared language of a nation. At the same
time, the focus on cultural heterogeneity prepares us for the difficulties that may
be encountered when participants do not share discursive traditions. As the
mounting literature on cross-cultural (mis)understanding makes clear (see for
example, Rahim, 1994; Pearce, 1989; Ting-Toomey and Oetzel; 2001; Jandt,
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2001) such dialogues may be frustrating and ineffectual. The dialogic moves ef-
fective for achieving goals within one tradition may be counterproductive in
conversations with those outside the tradition. Similarly, even within the same
culture the dialogic forms effective in one condition may not carry over to ano-
ther.6 Whatever is said about dialogic efficacy must thus be tempered by cons-
ciousness of contingency. Dialogic Forms and Their Outcomes
We may now return to the problem of value-saturated visions of dialogue.
Finally, in viewing dialogue as discursive coordination, I have attempted to avoid
conflating normative and descriptive commitments. Coordination in itself is
neither good nor evil. From the present standpoint, a heated argument is as much
a dialogue, as an attempt to gain an appreciative understanding of another’s
»point of view«. This is scarcely to abandon concern with the kinds of ideals
central to most contemporary analysts. Rather, it is to invite differentiation among
forms of dialogue in terms of the ends they serve. Thus, while certain forms of
dialogue may indeed succeed in reducing conflict, other forms of collaboration
may enable authority to be challenged, multiple opinions to be expressed, or taken-
for-granted realities to be deliberated. Drawing again from Wittgenstein (1963,
6e): »Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-
driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails, and screws. – The functions of words are as
diverse as the functions of these objects«. From this perspective, inquiry is invited
into the specific forms of dialogue required to achieve particular goals of value.
My own concern in this case has been with forms of what may be called
transformative dialogue, that is practices that succeed in blurring the boundaries
between otherwise isolated and alien groups of people (see, for example, Gergen,
2008).
There are many such practices in existence and indeed, on a grass-roots level
new developments are flourishing (see for example, Bojer et al., 2008; Yankelovich,
1999). However, the present account of dialogue as collaborative action invites
a particular form of analyzing these practices. Specifically, the analyst may address
the particular moves within the dialogic sequences that invite productive supple-
mentation. To illustrate, arguments as a dialogic practice seldom succeed in
bringing participants closer together in their orientations. In large measure this
is because arguments are often based on antagonism (»war by other means«), and
any discursive action taken on the part of one interlocutor will invite a supplement
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that discounts the value of the action. Participants may move through a space of
argument in such a way that neither can generate a line of reasoning that is ratified
as reasonable by the other. However, other practices are far more successful in
crossing boundaries of meaning, and the challenge is to locate what appear to be
successful moves in the collaborative sequences. For example, curious questions,
affirmations, narratives of anguish and admissions of doubt are all promising
moves (in contemporary Western culture) for bringing participants into common
space of understanding. Ultimately it may be possible to generate what amounts
to a vocabulary of dialogic moves, allowing new amalgams to be created as cir-
cumstances require.
It is finally important to note here that the value placed on dialogic outcomes
may vary significantly from one standpoint to another. For example, a vigorous
argument, from an outsider’s perspective, may seem aggressive and hostile. For
the participants, however, such skirmishes can be enlivening fun, much like a
game of chess. By the same token, the outcomes of any particular dialogue may
be simultaneously both positive and negative (see Thatchenkery & Upadhyaya,
1996). One may be pleased that a given dialogue succeeds in establishing intimate
bonds with another, but simultaneously realize that certain critical capacities are
suspended. And too, what is accomplished in a dialogue may be judged differently
in terms of what ensues at a later point in time. In effect, dialogue itself is subject
to the vicissitudes of dialogue.
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Endnotes
1 See Gergen (1994) for a more complete account of the impossibility of
communication in the dualist or mind/world tradition.
2 In this sense, the traditional binary separating monologue and dialogue is
misleading. The term monologue cannot refer to the language of one person
along, for such a language would fail to communicate. Thus monologue is
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better understood as an extended (or dominating) entry of a single voice
into a dialogue; in this sense monologue is an unevenly distributed dialogue.
3 See, for example, Garfinkel, 1967; Kuhn, 1970; Latour, 1987; Edwards &
Potter, 1992; Fish, 1980; and Shotter, 1993.
4 You may object: "Well, even if not acknowledged, what I say might mean
something to me personally," and that may be. But the question then beco-
mes, how did your utterances come to have personal meaning? I take up
this issue shortly.
5 See also J.L. Austin's How to do things with words (1962), in which the
performatory character of speech is illuminated.
6 See, for example, Well's (1999) discussion of optimal forms of classroom
dialogue.
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